In his work Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (2001 as cited in Koslicki, 2003; 107), Sider offers a "vagueness-based argument", which concerns the question : “Under what conditions do objects enter and exit existence,” or “What arrangements of matter are suitable for objects to enter (and exit) existence?” (Koslicki, 2003; 112). In his answer which supposedly proves universalism, Sider believes that this can be extended to the spacetime dimension and thus to four-dimensionalism. The structure of the essay is as follows: first I will consider the possible solutions to the question posed above. Second, I will reiterate Sider's argument and how he attempts to answer the question. Third, I will consider the position known as the “intermediate” position, using Koslicki's criticism of Sider to demonstrate my point. Finally, I will try to criticize the aspects that Koslicki concedes to Sider in defense of the nihilistic position. Therefore, in this essay, I will try to evaluate the vagueness argument for the four-dimensional metaphysics of material objects and, following Koslicki, argue that the non-temporalized argument does not work as well as Sider claims. So, the dependent temporalization argument works similarly. I argue that there are three solutions to the question “Under what conditions objects come into existence and out of existence: S1: Under all conditions (Sider's view which is called universalism). S2: Under some conditions (Intermediate).S3: Under no conditions (Nihilism).The argument posed by Sider (S1) can be seen as an argument by elimination, where the premises, if accepted, reject the possibility of S2 and S3. As such, the argument suffers from the question of whether it is possible to apply re... middle of paper... iticisms (120). Koslicki considers whether or not Sider's argument implies four-dimensionality, and comes to the conclusion that it does not since a three-dimensionalist can accept the conclusion, but remain a three-dimensionalist (121-122). A similar argument cannot be made for the nihilist since fusion is eliminated, although one could make the argument of a simple at any particular time, rather than of an object. As such, I believe I have provided potential alternatives to the question that the argument from the vagueness of solution attempts. Although the arguments I have given for the alternatives are prone to error, the goal is to show that it is possible to consider such alternatives instead of accepting universalism, and therefore four-dimensionality. Since the non-temporal argument suffers from this weakness, the temporal argument also suffers from this weakness.