Explain how Smart argues that brain processes are identical to mental sensations with respect to what he says about topic-neutral sensory language. Smart argues from the position of the identity theorist and believes that mental sensations are identical to a corresponding brain process. Much of Smart's article is a counterargument against an identity theorist's greatest rival, the dualist. Most of the human body has been explained by science in terms of biology, chemistry and physics; although the brain remains largely mysterious. Recent technological advances regarding brain research have allowed us to understand the mind in much better ways, which is why Smart believes that "science is increasingly providing us with a point of view by which organisms can be seen as mechanisms physico-chemical" (61). He introduces the concept of Ockham's razor and believes that scientists use it to introduce simplicity into their theories, which makes their explanations of concepts simpler. This simplicity is preferred because it also adds a sense of beauty to the laws discovered. Regarding the lightning example, Smart points out that our experience with lightning is the physical process of electrons discharged by the ionization of water vapor in the atmosphere. It is important to note here that the two cannot be separated; you will not have a flash of lightning and then an electrical discharge, rather the lightning is an electrical discharge. This metaphor is the essay's crucial argument that sensations are identical to brain processes. Ockham's razor eliminates unnecessary nomological dangers from scientific theories, so why not apply the same concept to a theory of mind? In our lightning theory we would not describe the terms 'flashy' or 'jagged... in the center of the card...', although we do not necessarily always choose topic-neutral terms for ourselves. For example, you may have said " it hurts like a ton of bricks,” but you've never encountered a ton of falling bricks in your life. Only when one has to report one's experiences to others should one express it in terms that are neutral to the topic, so that others can have an idea that this experience is similar to what they might experience mentally. However, we still cannot deny that sensations or mental states may be brain processes. We can only suggest that topic-neutral terms are simply useful for reporting to others and not always necessarily true. This is perhaps why Smart believed that the dualist objection was his greatest threat. Works Cited Chalmers, David John, comp. Philosophy of mind: classic and contemporary readings. New York: Oxford UP, 2002. Print.