Tufte (1978) and Hibbs (1987) both argue that there are two main political influences on macroeconomic policy: partisanship and electoral incentives. However, they differ in the emphasis they place on each influence. While Tufte emphasizes the influence of electoral incentives, Hibbs argues for the influence of partisanship. Franzese's (2002) analysis of electoral and partisan influences on macroeconomic outcomes suggests that there is empirical evidence to support Hibbs's claim. However, it also suggests that there is considerable space for an analysis of “contextually conditioned electoral and partisan cycles” (Franzese, 2002, p. 369). With this in mind, I argue that incumbent politicians can shift from partisanship to electoral incentives when confronted with specific national conditions. In particular, I argue that rulers will rationally choose to pursue a constituency-oriented economic policy rather than a partisan policy under conditions of party weakness. More specifically, under the assumption that incumbent presidents will seek re-election as both Tufte and Hibbs suggest, they will seek to use their status to influence the outcome of the election. Tufte argues that politicians will do this using “electorization” methods, while Hibbs finds evidence that incumbent politicians follow policies in line with their party's core beliefs. In a situation where an incumbent president believes that his party's electoral core is too weak or fragmented to permit reelection, I argue that the incumbent president will abandon partisan politics in favor of Tuftian electioneering. Furthermore, in the US context, I view the midterm elections as a signal that an incumbent president might consider when pursuing electoral or partisan politics. I will first… halfway through the paper… monetary policy tools that can target specific groups of fringe voters. Poor performance by an incumbent president's party during midterm elections may be a sign that the incumbent president's constituency is dissatisfied or too weak to provide sufficient support for reelection. This claim could be evaluated empirically by first looking for cases in which incumbents have changed strategy by observing evidence of inflation and policies characteristic of voter-oriented policies. Works Cited Franzese, R.J., Jr. (2002). Electoral cycles and partisanship in politics and economic outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 369–421. Hibbs, D. A., Jr. (1987). The American political economy: macroeconomics and electoral politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Tufte, E. R. (1978). Political control of the economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.