In this article I will argue in favor of implementing compulsory voting (compulsory attendance) in the United States. I will base this argument on the claim that compulsory voting would best solve the problem of low and unequal levels of voter turnout by making governance more representative, and therefore more democratic. To contextualize this statement, I confirm that democracy first and foremost means "government by the people". Furthermore, based on the evolution of democracy throughout its history, voting for representatives has become the most equitable means through which “the people” have the opportunity to “govern”. The problem I face, however, arises when people fail to exercise their formal right to vote, which results in democratic illegitimacy resulting from a lack of effectiveness caused by the increasing complexity of democracy, distancing the general population from political decisions. The United States, therefore, is a semi-democratic, semi-representative system of government in which decision-making is largely in the hands of a few, while the majority of Americans are, for the most part, fragmented from participation in politics. not only in voting, but in all aspects of participation). I will argue that this is a problem for democracy in the United States and that compulsory voting is the most effective method for increasing participation; and therefore it should be implemented. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay My argument for compulsory voting, then, depends largely on the value of my conception of democracy itself, the importance that participation has for the legitimacy of democracy, and an explanation of why the Voter turnout is the preeminent method for assessing participation in the context of contemporary democracy. Ultimately, one must accept that this concept of democracy best protects against tyranny, best provides liberty and freedom, and best develops and cultivates individuals. Furthermore, it must be demonstrated that the level of political participation of the general electorate is the most significant factor in determining the legitimacy of democracy. Finally, it must be demonstrated that voting is the most essential criterion through which the political participation of the electorate can be measured. If these claims can be defended, my case for compulsory voting is simple. I will make the case for compulsory voting by first addressing the strongest criticisms against these three central claims. First, there are other accepted notions of democracy that do not depend so much on the active participation of the electorate for legitimacy. Second, compulsory voting would interfere with our liberal ideals of freedom of choice and voluntary participation, violating our “right not to vote,” which is as valuable as voting itself. Finally, such constraint would not effectively resolve the underlying causes of illegitimacy, which are caused by structural limitations of modern democracy, unrelated to voter turnout. In response to the first criticism, I will expand my conception of democracy and ground its legitimacy in the historical framework upon which the United States was founded. Second, I will argue that compulsory voting does not in fact impede our right not to vote, and indeed increases our freedom on the basis of self-determination, autonomy and equal freedom, appealing to the hybrid republican/liberal framework on which the United States was founded. The United States is founded (Lacroix; Schafer). As for the last criticism, I'll blend my ownresponse on the claim that higher voter turnout would not create perfect democratic legitimacy, but that it would better address factors such as responsiveness, effectiveness, and trust in government. I will conclude by arguing that compulsory voting would provide the best alternative for a return to democracy, putting power back in the hands of the people. THE first response to my argument for compulsory voting would be a criticism of the conception of democracy on which I have based my argument. In essence, opponents argue that there are other accepted conceptions of contemporary democracy that do not place as much emphasis on the political participation of the electorate. For example, some thinkers, such as Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter, argue that the competitive elitist conception of democracy may be necessary to address “the complexities, problems, and decisions of modern politics” (Held 139). Within this conception, legitimacy resides in the competence of political elites, who are able to make the best public decisions. According to Schumpeter, compulsory voting would amount to a “quagmire of factional infighting and entirely ineffective in resolving urgent collective issues” (Held 141). This argument is based on the assertion that ignorance pervades the minds of the average voter as they participate in politics. This is because, according to Schumpeter, in many public affairs the general public is completely extraneous, in the sense that it has no real responsibility regarding these affairs. This lack of general knowledge of public affairs is a problem that cannot be solved by education (Held 144). In essence, it follows from this argument that voting is important to give the impression of responsibility, so that people believe they are represented. Furthermore, voting should be the only avenue through which the general electorate has the opportunity to participate in politics. Essentially, this train of thought follows that if participation were universal, politics would become governed by the uninformed and unwise masses. (Held 231). However, I would argue that this type of argument is simply undemocratic in any conception of the term. It seems that Weber is simply skeptical of democracy in the first place; fearing equal participation for all. In this sense, it does not even subscribe to the fundamental foundation of all democratic thought, which is at least some form of responsibility and protection of individuals. As Held writes, “if it were simply a choice between tyranny and competitive elitism…the latter would obviously be desirable…but the rich tradition of democratic thought indicates that these are far from the only avenues open” (157). Therefore, I argue that this elitist democracy is simply an illegitimate conception of democracy, which means that any argument against coercion based on its conception is unfounded. Furthermore, if voting did not alter outcomes within competitive elitism, then it would seem appropriate that almost everyone would have to vote to give the impression of popular sovereignty. In other words, even in the most minimal form of democracy advocated by Schumpeter, compulsory voting still remains a plausible possibility. The justification for compulsory voting lies in the assertion that democracy means “government by the people”. However, it is important to pay attention to all counterarguments, and these arguments also introduce interesting questions about the meaning of democracy. Fundamentally, there is the issue of defining democracy as civic virtue through self-realization (republicanism/liberalism), or democracy solely as a means to pursue our endsself-chosen (elitism) (Held 231). However, I argue that compulsory voting does not violate any of these principles of democracy. Rather, high voter turnout would be a means that would increase both the freedom of collective or individual self-determination and the freedom to pursue our own chosen ends. This is because, contrary to an elitist framework, political participation is the method through which individuals make decisions based on their preferences. This is the fundamental reason why participation gives legitimacy to governments. However, less extreme conceptions of democracy may hold that self-government is the basis of legitimacy, but reject the idea that voting is the main instrument by which legitimacy is measured. Instead, these alternative conceptions of democracy argue that there are other vital determinants of legitimacy besides voting. To give an example, drawing on classical pluralism, protective democracy and developmental democracy, Lever writes: “In general, democracies provide a variety of arenas and ways in which we can act collectively as citizens and develop our capacities to define and pursue collective, as well as personal, interests… [and that] voting is, at best, only one form of [this] democratic political participation” (908-909; Held 78, 92, 173). In addition to this notion of collective action, another concept of democracy, legal democracy, argues that, in addition to participation, the constitution, the rule of law, and the free market are the main determinants of legitimacy (Held 207). This argument is compelling, as it accepts accountability and protection of citizens' interests (which I have highlighted) as fundamental to the legitimacy of governance, while rejecting the claim that voting is the most significant factor in terms of accountability and protection. . However, I believe that compulsory voting would not interfere with these conceptions, since the founding of the United States was based on both the classical liberal and republican frameworks (cite Federalist documents). Therefore, based on liberal thinking, democracy in the United States means the “pursuit of happiness” through government protection. And on the other hand, based on republican thought, democracy means “self-determination for the common good” (Held 48). The reason compulsory voting is hotly contested in modern America is that the liberal framework has become salient, while the Republican framework has been largely forgotten. This created the mindset that government is legitimized not by participation, but by legal and structural institutions such as the U.S. Constitution, the rule of law, and the functioning of the free market (Held 207). Through these institutions, as long as citizens are protected by the government, as well as each other, they will be able to pursue their own interests, “free from risks of violence, unacceptable social behavior, and unwanted political interference” (Held 78). This mindset reduces the incentive for political participation, which, according to the founding of the United States, is just as important to legitimacy as structural institutions. In illustrating this point, Engelen writes that “without popular sovereignty – guaranteed by a democracy in which people participate in decisions that bind them – individual rights and freedoms remain purely formal and empty” (221). Therefore, this structural concept of legitimacy creates what I have called a democratic deficiency, which is caused by the inability of structural institutions to make representatives accountable and responsive to the people as a whole. However, still referring to Lever, tooIf we accept that the United States was founded on both liberal and republican structures, then we are still left with one question. Why is voting the most significant factor in measuring legitimacy within contemporary democracy? In other words, because voting prevails over “other ways of defining and pursuing collective interests,” such as “in business, culture, sports and the arts, education, healthcare, public administration, law, [or ] the military” (Leva 909). In essence, Lever argues that even if “duly elected representatives have the right to pass laws on our behalf, to overturn those that have been made, to appoint persons to act for us, and to enforce collectively binding decisions,” it does not follow that these tasks are more important “than other forms of collective choice and action, whether administrative, judicial, executive, or benevolent” (909-910). I argue that the main problem with Lever's statement is that it fails to address the reason for representation. In the United States, the most significant factor of legitimacy lies in the fact that citizens choose their own elected officials. To illustrate this point; if every citizen chose to abstain from choosing their elected officials, there would be no accountability or need for response between the officials and the electorate, opening the way to the possibility of tyranny. Therefore, in this case, individuals may not even have the opportunity to pursue individual or collective interests, since such opportunities may no longer exist. Furthermore, since legitimacy lies first and foremost in representation, voting also takes precedence over “other forms of collective action, be they administrative, judicial, executive or charitable,” because if no one voted, these other forms would have no accountability or transparency. against representatives, opening the door to arbitrary government control. The second general response to my argument in favor of compulsory voting fits largely within a framework of liberal thought. One such argument follows that it is unclear whether there is a moral duty to vote and that abstention must be protected, since it is itself a voluntary political choice. For example, Lever writes that “people's interests in non-participation are intimately tied to the justification of democratic rights of choice, expression, and association” (self-government). “They are not, therefore, trivial, as advocates of coercion assume, but have weight and justification comparable to people's interests in political participation itself” (904). In addition to this, Lever also argues that “voluntary political participation is a distinctive human good, and that democracies are justified in part by their ability to realize this good and make it available to most, almost all, of their populations” . "(910). This argument is intriguing and troubling, as thus far I have based my argument in part on the value of self-government. However, I argue that this value of self-government is secondary to the value of accountability. The justification for democracy lies primarily in what Held calls “legitimate authority” (2). For this reason, the other values ​​(self-determination, satisfaction of needs and social utility) that derive from democracy are secondary. Therefore, I believe that compulsory voting and the compromises that would result from it are justified in order to make government as legitimate as possible. Furthermore, it is a false premise to assume that the majority of non-voters choose to abstain from politics because they “value self-government” (Lever 910). part, non-voters abstain from politics because ofincreasing complexity of governance, resulting in apathy, lack of effectiveness and low levels of trust in government. Furthermore, without compulsory voting, ever-lower levels of participation remain a possibility, further illegitimating government. And as mentioned above, if this happened, citizens would have fewer opportunities “to pursue collective, as well as personal, interests” (Lever 909). Therefore, high levels of political participation are necessary to ensure opportunities for self-governance and self-determination. Compulsory voting would increase levels of political participation. Thus, contrary to Lever's claims, compulsory voting would increase, rather than decrease, our opportunities for self-government. Similarly, another argument within the liberal framework is that compulsion is not compatible with freedom understood as non-interference, or negative freedom, which takes precedence over other democratic ideals such as participation and equality. This argument is based on John Stuart Mill's harm principle; “that the only purpose for which power can be legitimately exercised over any member of a civil community, against his will, is to prevent harm by others” (68). The argument against compulsory voting, therefore, stems from this forcing that people showing up to the polls on election day constitutes a violation of personal liberty because it does not satisfy the harm principle. When citizens choose to abstain from voting, they are simply making a personal choice, without causing any harm to others. It follows that citizens should not be forced to vote. However, this argument is based on an overly simplistic reading of Mill's words. Interestingly, Mill also writes that when we do not participate, it is more difficult to discover our needs and desires, arrive at judgments, and develop mental excellence. Consequently, for Mill, active participation is the best mechanism for developing our human development and for creating “imaginative solutions and successful strategies” (Held 82). More importantly, Mill also writes that “the rights and interests of any person are safe from being ignored only when the person concerned is himself able, and habitually willing, to defend them” (Mill 224). In this sense, it seems that Mill attributes an intrinsic value to political participation. When more and more people do not vote, the level and value of participation rights is lowered, which in turn would reduce freedom and liberty for all. Therefore, compulsory voting actually fits the liberal paradigm (Lacroix). In fact it might even fit the liberal paradigm better than voluntary voting. As Lacroix has argued, however, in the case of coercion it is not enough to say that political participation fits the liberal framework. Instead, “it is also essential to establish that the duty to vote does not constitute a violation of liberal rights” (Lacroix 192). In establishing that coercion would not interfere with individual rights, Lacroix relies on “the notions of freedom as autonomy and of equal freedom” (192). Regarding autonomy, Lacroix writes that compulsory voting (which simply means compulsory attendance) does not limit individual conscience or choice, since citizens would still have the possibility of casting a blank ballot. Regarding the freedom of autonomy, Lacroix understands that freedom simply means respect for the laws that have been made. Furthermore, since compulsory voting would not effectively limit individual conscience, it would not violate the “liberal distinction between public and private spheres, which, according to Judith Shklar, is neither 'permanent' nor 'unalterable' as 'theimportant for liberalism is not so much where the line is drawn, but rather that it is drawn and that it must under no circumstances be ignored or forgotten” (Lacroix 193). Relying on the principle of equal freedom, Lacroix cites studies finding that low voter turnout actually equates to unequal turnout, that is, groups of people with a higher level of education and higher income are more likely to vote, and vice versa. For Lacroix, this phenomenon violates the liberal principle of equal freedom, which “aims to guarantee freedom for all and to create the conditions necessary for the full exercise of individual freedom” without violating individual rights (194). Therefore, as has been noted earlier in the course of my argument, compulsory voting can be justified within the liberal framework, on the grounds that it best prevents arbitrary government control and domination by making elections as fair as possible and representative as possible (195). Opponents who support the liberal framework also ask why we shouldn't institute alternative, less invasive policies to try to solve the problem of low voter turnout. With this argument, opponents admit that low voter turnout is a problem and that political participation is a positive ideal. However, they argue that compulsory voting still violates individual freedom and the choice not to vote to some extent. Instead of compulsory voting, less extreme alternatives should be instituted, such as same-day registration, weekend voting, or education reform. Once again, liberals are exaggerating the intrusiveness of compulsory voting. For example, if we were to cancel mandatory voting on the violation of individual liberty, we would be forced to write about jury duty and paying taxes, civic duties that are widely accepted and followed. Furthermore, as Lacroix illustrated, compulsory voting simply means compulsory presence at the polls on election days, which means it does not undermine individual conscience. Furthermore, compulsory voting is simply the most effective alternative for increasing voter turnout. Simply, if we conceded that low voter turnout is a real concern, then it would be a mistake to rule out compulsory voting. The final main argument against compulsory voting is that it would not solve the underlying causes of democratic deficiency and elitist governance. Instead of instituting compulsory voting, more radical changes to the system itself are needed to resolve the problems of accountability and legitimacy caused by low levels of participation and civic engagement. So, in essence, while this argument agrees with supporters of compulsory voting that low levels of participation are a problem, it disagrees on the solution to the problem. An example of this line of thinking comes from Mark Bevir. In his book “Democratic Governance,” Bevir carefully examines the changing nature of the modern state, finding that these changes have caused concerns about the accountability and legitimacy of democracy. This, according to Bevir, is due to the attempt to create governance that combines representative democracy with the use of “expertise based on modernist social science” (270). For Bevir, this posed a problem for democracy because this “expertise” “is a mistake… and cannot deliver on its promises” (270). In essence, these new skills-based approaches to governance are not compatible with the fundamental ideals of democracy. Bevir argues that, within the modern state, we must not continue to rely on representative democracy forresolve issues of accountability and legitimacy. Instead, a new informal, pluralist and participatory democracy, built around diverse openings and support for citizens to express their voice, enter into dialogue and govern themselves” (Bevir 273). Therefore, Bevir would argue that compulsory voting would not solve the underlying problems facing democracy in the modern era. I agree with Bevir that low voter turnout is due to a lack of political efficacy caused by a lack of valuable civic education, the growth of polarized political parties, and the rise of an unaccountable bureaucracy. [9] However, I argue that Bevir's solution to the democratic deficiency is simply not a practical possibility within the current system of democracy in the United States. While recognizing that other forms of political participation besides voting have value, it is important to remember the importance I have attributed to voting as the fairest and most significant factor for democratic legitimacy. In Bevir's words, “formal representative democracy certainly embodies an equality that I would be reluctant to reject: an election can allow each citizen to have exactly one vote” (270). Therefore, as I have argued, equality is the reason why the formal institution of voting is so important for legitimacy. So, if voting levels are not at an adequate level, then there is a concern about legitimacy, and this is why I argue that compulsory voting can be justified. Furthermore, compulsory voting could actually stimulate political interest in the electorate, resulting in growth in civic engagement, creating avenues for citizens to “develop voice, enter into dialogue, and govern themselves” (Bevir 273). This would happen because if compulsory voting were implemented, schools would feel a greater need to educate future citizens about the structure and practice of government, the value of democracy, and the fundamentals of political issues. This education would then stimulate greater interest and effectiveness in the electorate as people would realize the importance of political participation. Similarly, a related argument is that compulsory voting would actually increase uneducated voting, or random voting, which would likely have no effect on legitimizing results, or could even lead to “unfair results” (Brennan). Furthermore, some people may simply be destined to vote and participate, while others may be better suited to themselves and society by staying home and watching from the sidelines. While yes, while it is important for people to be represented, it doesn't seem like it would add value to the democratic process if new voters weren't informed about the issues in the first place. Furthermore, coercion would take away meaning from the voluntary act of voting. For example, regarding voluntary participation, Rawls writes that “the effect of self-government, where equal political rights have their due value, is to increase the self-esteem and sense of political competence of the average citizen…this education public spirit is necessary if citizens are to acquire an affirmative sense of political duty and obligation, that is, a sense that goes beyond the mere willingness to submit to law and government” (Rawls 234). In other words, the responsibility for self-government and political obligations fall on the individuals themselves, and lose weight if there is no willingness on the part of the individual to participate in the first place. Regarding the fear of incompetence, I argue that compulsory voting might actually arouse interest and need to be informed about issues, thus creating a willingness to participate. This.