The merger between General Electric (GE) and Honeywell would have been the largest merger ever between two industrial companies and would have increased GE's size by almost a third . GE is a leading manufacturer of aircraft engines, and Honeywell is a leading manufacturer of avionics systems (such as engine starters). This was an exceptional merger as it was the first time a merger between two US companies had been derailed solely by the European Antitrust Commission (EC), after being cleared by the US Department of Justice (DoJ). to block the merger was based on two main arguments pointing to the dominant position and an "incompatibility with the common market". There was an incentive to bundle complementary products, creating an exclusive package not available on the current market. This could have led to a decline in rivals' profits, encouraging them to abandon the market and giving GE/Honeywell a dominant position. There is also concern that GE may extend the “GE Only” policy of its aircraft leasing service (GECAS) to Honeywell products; encouraging manufacturers to choose GE and Honeywell as engine and system suppliers, once again leading them to a dominant position. Both were elements of “GE's dominance toolkit” (Drauz, 2001). Professor Choi, in 2001 (on behalf of Rolls Royce), modeled the potential for conglomerate effects arising from the pooling of assets by the merged entity, which could lead to reduced competition. It states that consumers must purchase an engine together with a set of avionics, making the goods complementary, and assumes that the same price is charged to all consumers. Choi considers a market in which there are only two engine suppliers (GE and Rolls Royce) and two avionics suppliers (Honeywell and... middle of paper...) he highlighted the potentially advantageous price reduction in the short term Considering that the EC began its analysis with long-term effects and the fact that the pooling naturally leads to an anticompetitive outcome, examining possible future outcomes, as the EC has done, requires discounting and calculating the probability of their occurrence by noting that the model used by the EC to demonstrate foreclosures due to the grouping was rejected in the final decision. The Court of First Instance (CFI) rejected the EC's pooling analysis, concluding that it fell short of the required standards. The merger made clear the inconsistency between the EC's “long-term ambitious” methods and those “ short-term practices” of the DoJ. Reforms have since been made, mainly by the EC, to create a more coherent analysis based on available economic models and empirical evidence.