In this article I will defend David Hume's moral sense theory, which states that, like sight and hearing, morality is a perceptual sense derived from our emotional responses. Because morality arises from our emotional responses rather than reason, morality is not objective. Furthermore, the emotional basis of morality is demonstrated empirically in recent psychology studies, the areas of the brain associated with emotions are the most active while making a moral judgment. My argument will be divided into two parts: first, that morality is response-dependent, meaning that although reason is still a contributing factor to our moral judgments, they are mainly produced by our emotional responses, and finally that every individual has a moral sense. they are not objective because morality depends on the response, it derives from our emotions, or passions, rather than from reason. In his argument on the basis of morality in A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume states: “Philosophy is commonly divided into the speculative and the practical; and as morality is always subsumed under this last division, it is supposed to influence our passions and actions. He later argues: "Since morality, therefore, has an influence on actions and affections, it follows that they cannot be derived from reason[...] Morals excites the passions and produces or prevents actions" (Hume 1978). At the root of each of our actions, we discover that we will always trace it back to the feeling that caused it. For example, I chose not to lie to my parents about spending a lot of money because I knew it would be wrong. It wouldn't be wrong just because my parents raised me to believe that lying is wrong, but also because I would feel guilty if I disrespected them. Therefore, we judge a… middle of paper… 2006. “Doing the Right Thing: A Common Neural Circuit for Appropriate Violent or Compassionate Behavior” to be wrong or bad. Neuroimage 30: 1069-76.Moll, J., de Oliviera-Souza, R., Eslinger, P.J., Bramati, I.E., Mourao-Miranda, J., Andreiuolo, P.A., and Pessoa, L. 2002. “The Neural Correlates of moral sensitivity: A functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation of basic and moral emotions. Journal of Neuroscience 22:2730–36.Plato. "504a-519e." Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2004. 1125-137.Prinz, J.J. “Can Moral Obligations Be Discovered Empirically?” Midwestern Studies in Philosophy 31 (2007): 271–291. doi: 10.1111/j.1475- 4975.2007.00148.xRaphael, David Daiches. British moralists, 1650-1800. Oxford: Clarendon, 1969. Valdesolo, P., and DeSteno, D. 2006. “Manipulations of Emotional Context Shape Moral Judgment.” Psychological science 17: 476–77.