It is now established that freedom of expression is one of the most cherished values ​​of a free democratic society. It is essential for the functioning of a democratic society whose fundamental postulate is that government is based on the consent of the governed. But such consensus implies not only that the consensus is free, but also that it is based on adequate information and discussion and aided by the widest possible dissemination of information and opinions from different and antagonistic sources. The media reporting and publishing the issue must provide "fair and accurate" information, based on solid evidence and sources. A responsibility has been given to the media and should be handled accordingly. Freedom of expression, which includes freedom of the press, is broad in content and is not limited to the expression of accepted and acceptable thoughts and ideas, but also to those that offend or shock any section of the population. It also includes the right to receive information and ideas of all kinds from different sources. In essence, freedom of expression embodies the right to knowledge. However, under our Constitution, no rights in Part III are absolute. Freedom of expression is not an absolute value according to our Constitution. It must not be forgotten that no single value, however high, can bear the entire burden of supporting a democratic system of government. Therefore, notwithstanding that any provision of Part III of the Constitution is not absolute, it must be understood that if, by implication, the ambit of 'freedom of speech and expression' has become wider, then similarly, by implication, certain 'restrictions preventive' are applicable, which means that the media must understand that their freedom to... middle of paper... interferes with the course of justice or the due administration of justice. According to Nigel Lowe and Brenda Sufrin, even in the context of the second part of articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution, the object of the law of contempt is not only to punish, but includes the power of the courts to prevent such acts which interfere with, hinder or pervert the administration of justice. If in a given case the competent court finds violation of this presumption on account of excessive prejudicial publicity by newspapers (generally), then, under inherent powers, the courts of record suo motu either on application or on report submitted to it by a subordinate court may, within its inherent powers under section 129 or section 215, make orders deferring publication for a limited period if the appellant is able to demonstrate a risk substantial prejudice to the pending trial.