The purpose of this article will examine the notion of equality with respect to the value of life as it is contained in the discussion between Tom Regan and RG Frey. Regan argues that “all who have intrinsic value have it equally” (Regan 66). Frey, in contrast, argues that not all lives can have the same intrinsic value since the potential for enrichment is not the same for all lives. Taking both arguments into consideration, the rest of this article will attempt to reconcile them, suggesting that a reasonable compromise is possible. Regan supports his argument with the following premises:1. All human life has the same intrinsic value solely because every human being is a subject who experiences life.2. All experimental subjects of life have the same intrinsic value in and of themselves (regardless of any additional qualifying characteristics).3. Therefore, “all [subjects who experience life] who have intrinsic value have it equally” (Regan 66). Before continuing, a definition of 'subject experiencing life' (ESL) is needed. Regan defines an ESL as a “conscious creature having individual well-being that matters to [themselves] whatever [their] usefulness to others” (65). In essence, an ESL is anything aware of its own existence with an interest in its own well-being, regardless of its value to others. This is important to animal rights advocates like Regan, as it encompasses the lives of sentient animals and gives all conscious beings the same intrinsic value (except in specific life-threatening situations). An example of this can be clarified in the case of a lonely homeless person with no family, job or responsibilities. Clearly, at least in this case, the homeless person has no use for others. However, since it is a conscientious... middle of paper......er intentionally or accidentally is not clear) it allows someone to devalue their life if they want. I argue that this can only be achieved by weighing the value of life and allowing those who find their life to be of less value to end it at their discretion. These exceptions do not violate equal intrinsic value for people who are conscious and aware. /or value one's life, but at the same time allow for situations in which equal weighting of life's value is counterintuitive. As a result, all ESLs remain the same, but things outside the scope of consideration for the ESL may be of disproportionate value. I argue that the compromise, set out above, appeals to both Regan and Frey. For Regan, it preserves the same intrinsic value, both animals and people, while also considering and allowing Frey's exceptions for those with a low or worsening quality of life.