In his 1971 article “Personal Identity,” Derek Parfit postulates that it is possible and indeed desirable to free important questions from assumptions about personal identity without losing everything that matters. In trying to figure out how to do this, Parfit comes to the conclusion that “the question of identity is of no importance” (Parfit, 1971, p. 4.2:3). In this essay I will try to demonstrate that Parfit's thesis is valid, with positive implications for human behavior. The first section of the essay will examine the thesis in more detail, and the second will evaluate how Parfit's claims fare in the face of criticism. Personal identity issues generally involve questions about what makes a person who they are and what it takes to be the same. person exists at separate times (Olson, 2010). Parfit aims to defend the following two claims about personal identity:1. That sometimes questions about personal identity don't have a clear answer; e2. That we can still answer important questions about, for example, responsibility, memory, and survival, even if we cannot answer questions about identity. Although he admits that some of these important questions presuppose personal identity, Parfit believes that we can overcome this problem by valorizing These questions regardless of the notion of personal identity. Division Parfit uses a famous case of division (or fission), as imagined by Wiggins (1967), to illustrate his claim that identity is not what matters for survival. When A's brain is split into two parts, each housed in two separate, brainless bodies (B and C), we appear to have three options. Or do we believe that:1. A has ceased to exist;2. A survives as B or C; o3. A survives both B and C. Parfit argues against the first... middle of paper... not easy to disprove, although I believe that instead of rejecting all exotic thought experiments we should perhaps judge the suitability of each individual scenario in based on their own merits. This seems to be a more achievable task. Parfit readily admits that the idea that we can store everything that matters without identity is counterintuitive. However, I believe that it stands up well to criticism and appears to have significant positive implications for morality and responsibility. In undermining the importance of identity, Parfit also attacks selfish principles: “Selfishness, fear or death not near but distant… are not, I believe, entirely natural or instinctive. They are all reinforced by the beliefs about personal identity that I have attached. If we give up these beliefs, they should be weakened” (Parfit, 1971, p. 4.2:14).